This article explores the burgeoning realm of videos uploaded on YouTube generated from content produced in
In this article, I will first highlight some of the unique qualities of North Korea's engagement with social media, specifically YouTube. Then, to illustrate how these specificities impact North Korea's social media presence, I focus primarily on children's performances, which have garnered the lion's share of attention. To provide some critical context, I will analyze some of the ideological features of these videos, interpreting their meanings according to the conventions of North Korean political ideology. Drawing upon recent digital ethnography and also from my earlier ethnographic observations from my trip to the DPRK in 2007, the main purpose of this article is to compare the intended political meanings of these videos alongside their international reception and remediation on YouTube. I argue that North Korea's engagement with social media is marked by a profound disjuncture; in other words, the majority of these videos portray ideological North Korean subjects in an online context where very few North Korean citizens are able to engage with this material as social media in the Web 2.0 formats of YouTube, Facebook and Twitter. Even if we interpret these videos solely as external propaganda aimed at non-North Koreans, there is often a disconnect between the material's propagandistic aims and its actual online reception and remediation. Non-North Korean viewers who do have access make sense of this material in diverse and individual ways, often without the historical, linguistic, social, or other contextual tools needed to receive this ideological information in the manner that it was intended. This highly disjunct relationship between the production and reception of North Korean videos on social media makes it a fascinating case study in reception as theorized by Stuart Hall in his seminal 1973 "Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse" article. In this article, he lays the foundation for the significance of reception studies by positing that we cannot assume that a "text" will be received as the producers intended because readers will interpret or decode it according to their own life experiences, frames of reference, and background.
3 In this way, one of the main purposes of this article is to nuance these various points of disjuncture as they play out in the reception and remediation of North Korean children's performances on YouTube.
Within the realm of social media, in particular, I view the concepts of reception and remediation as interrelated. I define reception to encompass the diversity of responses to a particular performance, text, video, sound, image, artwork, or other type of expressive cultural object. In social media contexts, these responses may be as simple as a single individual view or may take the form of a "like/thumb's up" or "dislike/thumb's down" response on YouTube. As simple as these responses are, they gain significance in their repeatability, and have become powerful indicators of an item's popularity or ability to engage people (whether positive or negative). More complex forms of reception include textual responses that can be found in the online comment field, offline interpretations or discussions, and other types of negotiations or engagements with the original object. It is in the last type of reception where remediation begins and where the line between reception and remediation begins to disappear. In defining remediation, I adhere to Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin's definition of remediation as the "representation," "repurposing," or "refashioning" of a form of media from one medium to another. 4 In our contemporary world of social media where the re-posting and re-framing of media is commonplace, I argue that remediation can be seen as a hypermediated form of reception.
In analyzing the reception and remediation of North Korean videos of children's performances, I employ techniques of virtual or digital ethnography by approaching websites and digital media as cultural texts and mutually-inflecting digital ontologies, or, in Rene Lysloff and Leslie Gay's term, as "technocultures" of a given community, social system, or institution.
5 In a more text-specific approach,
anthropologists Graham Jones and Bambi Schieffelin have analyzed texting and commenting as rich sites of dialogic and even metalinguistic data that refute the widespread notion that "YouTube's comment forums are the most 'loud' and 'dumb' corner of the Internet." 6 I will employ a combination of these approaches by examining aspects of production and remediation that can be garnered through audiovisual analysis as well as reception through the comments that accompany each video.
North Korea Today, 6436 videos). 8 As of 2016, two of the most prolific of these were StimmeKoreas and Uriminjokkiri; together, they were responsible for the uploading of close to 15,000 videos of North Korean content. Not surprisingly, both of these channels were targeted for shutdown in September 2017, although StimmeKoreas appears to be back up to its former capacity with 3480 videos uploaded.
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Of these channels, several focus almost exclusively on uploading music and dance videos. These include: DPRK Music (824), VOK216 (128 videos), Songs from the DPRK (200 videos), Ming Kim (156 videos), DPRKMusic1 (31 videos), DPRKconcert (24 videos), Urinore1 (371 videos), DPRKMusic (formerly AnStasyuk, 303 videos), and Chosunmusiccom (267 videos). Although it is no longer one of the more active channels, DPRKMusic is especially significant because its selection of mostly music performance videos has attracted more than 35 million views.
10 This is a strong indication of the power of music to attract outside views and thereby act as one of the more significant social media windows into North Korean society.
In terms of access in North Korea, it is widely assumed that the state asserts a great deal of control over the content and flow of this media. The majority of the DPRK's citizens do not have access to the Internet. For example, according to Max Fisher, the DPRK has only 1000 or so IP addresses per 25 million people. Fisher writes that "the number of people in North Korea with actual internet access is estimated at a few thousand-most of them government officials."
11 Interestingly, recent reporting suggests that the select North Korean elite and government officials who do have access tend to use the Internet in ways that are similar to users in China or the United States, where common activities include streaming video content, shopping online, browsing the web, and checking their social media accounts. 12 It should be mentioned that there is a close, state-sanctioned intranet system called Kwangmyong that is available mainly in Pyongyang. As in other places with limited Internet access, North Koreans have also used creative workarounds to accessing online content, such as the use of "sneakernet" or the smuggling of files (text, audio-visual, etc.) by physically moving portable and detachable media (USB flash drives) from one computer or device to another. 13 Interviews with North Korean refugees suggests that this is fairly widespread. 14 Even so, there are some obvious differences and limitations with North Korea's engagement with the "sneakernet." For one, the focus of "sneakernet" is primarily on outside content, like South Korean K-pop videos, for example. Second, North Koreans cannot engage and interact "socially" with digital media in real time without Internet access, resulting in less user-generated content and a focus on the "self" as a subject. When taking into consideration the growing North Korean refugee community, it is important to note that this dynamic is slowly shifting in interesting ways as North Korean refugee personalities, like Yeon-mi Park, begin to assert their presence online. Another critical issue pertaining to the nature of North Korean social media has to do the question of who is uploading the material and for what purpose. Given that most of the material featuring North Korean musicians and dancers is produced by the state-sanctioned KCTV broadcast channel, the simple answer is the North Korean state. However, the reality is not so simple. Although some YouTube channels have clearer connections to the DPRK state, such as Uriminzokkiri (which has been shut down), many are curated channels from friendly actors of the DPRK, where the relationship between these friends and the state is somewhat unclear. From what I can ascertain from the range of language preferences, it is highly likely that these actors hail from outside of the DPRK, possibly from as far flung locations as Mexico, Russia, Japan, the United States, and China.
This all goes so far as to say that in the world of social media, "the state" is less monolithic than it is presented on other traditional forms of media such as broadcast radio or television. In addition, even with state-sanctioned media, those who curate the channels have some degree of limited power to frame North Korea in various ways. So, for example, some promote an extremely militaristic view of North Korea by only uploading these types of songs, such as those found in the Songs from the DPRK channel (200 videos). In contrast, the aforementioned DPRKMusic curated a more viewer-friendly and appealing window by uploading mainly music and dance videos, often featuring cute children and attractive women performing state-sanctioned virtuosity. Despite this, it is important to note that by virtue of being produced in a highly-controlled state, North Korean content is automatically marked as political. Even when the subject is North Korean beer, noodles, or music, it is all too easy to view this material as propaganda.
Despite these complexities, it appears that North Korea's use of social media on the Internet is meant primarily to direct their state-sanctioned content to the outside world in order to gain and cultivate social and economic support in South Korea, Japan, and China, as well as other parts of the world. 21 She goes on to further complicate this by arguing that even within North Korea, the "actual operation of propaganda...is much more discursive" and therefore can be read in various individual ways. 22 While I cannot at this point nuance this discursive process as it occurs within North Korea, I can look at how this discursive process plays out in reception on YouTube, where most of the viewers are outsiders who are divorced from both the subjects of the videos as well as from DPRK society in general.
Before examining the reception of these videos, however, I will first provide a summary analysis of the features of the production common among these North Korean children's performances, with an eye towards how they attempt to "manipulate and persuade" their subjects, as Suk-Young Kim suggests. North Korean children's performances are largely produced and edited to represent a highly controlled state while highlighting children as model subjects. The children are always impeccably dressed and groomed, wearing matching school uniforms or coordinated costumes. These children perform with few, if any, mistakes. Their manner of performance-including body movements and facial expressions (usually smiles)-are highly stylized and sometimes choreographed. If there is more than one performer, their movements and facial expressions are often synchronized. In these ways, music and dance serve as powerful modes of disciplining young children into "happy" subjects who demonstrate extraordinary technical virtuosity and artistic mastery.
Given the ideological intentions of these videos, some scholars have raised the possibility of these videos being faked with overdubbed sound. While I cannot confirm with certainty whether all the videos in question represent actual live performances, I can respond to this feedback with a few points. First, most of the videos appear to be recordings of live performances that take place on stage with an audience present. In addition, microphones are present on stage, which would suggest that the performers were not 18 Salvador Rodriguez, "North Korea's Twitter, Flickr accounts hacked; Anonymous speaks up," Los Angeles Times, April 4, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/04/business/la-fi-tn-north-korea-anonymous-twitter-flickr-20130404. 19 Rebecca Stein, "StateTube, figure 2 ]. Based on this limited experience, it appears that it is quite within the norm for North Korean children to perform at this high of a level. Furthermore, I was surprised also to find that many different kindergartens and elementary schools are represented in the titles of these videos, suggesting that the musical disciplining of young children in North Korea is fairly widespread, at least in the capital of Pyongyang. If this is the case, the motivation to fake these performances would be quite low if there are already many children who can perform at this level. With this said, all of these videos did show some evidence of post-production, so it is possible the sound could have been edited and that the accompanying text could be misleading. Even so, my final point is that regardless of any pre-or post-production editing or the presence of outright syncing to pre-recorded sound, the majority of these children's performances are produced to index or be iconic of live performance in order to showcase aspirational North Korean children as model subjects.
23 Whether the performances are "actual" or not does not impact their intended ideological message; it only gestures towards the extent to which the state would go in order to achieve this message. In North Korean ideology, children are especially significant because they function in various forms of expressive North Korean media as aspirational subjects within the imagined patriarchal nation-state where Kim Il-Sung-and to a lesser extent, his male successors-are assumed as father figures. . 24 The importance of children as aspirational subjects in North Korea has a long and complex history, some of which can be tracked through the study of North Korean children's literature. Korean studies scholar, Dafna Zur, for example, shows how North Korean writers were influenced by Soviet ideas about targeting and reforming children as ideal socialist subjects through literature. For more about how these ideas developed in early North Korean science fiction for children, see: Dafna Zur, "Let's Go to the Moon: Science Fiction in the North Korean Children's Magazine 'Adong Munhak ', 1956-1965 Notably, children usually perform on stage by themselves. Parental or other adult figures are absent or minimized on stage and, if present, the adult figure is usually a woman who will not challenge the implied presence of the North Korean leader as father figure [figure 5 ]. In addition, these children are further infantilized, first through the disproportionate promotion of extremely young performers (4 to 6 years old is common) and second through their manner of dress and presentation. Girls are often dressed with extremely short, baby-doll-length skirts, even when wearing more traditional dress or chosŏnot, where ankle-length skirts that modestly cover the knees is more the norm. To take this further, performance clothing styles and hairstyle tendencies in the preschool/kindergarten and early elementary school age group further emphasize a hyper-girlishness that lays an early foundation for the multiple ways in which gender is inscribed in the DPRK. For example, younger girls are often dressed in a more diverse range of bright colors with their longer hair pulled back or braided in different styles, whereas older girls dress in ways that are more uniform. When fleeting glimpses of the audience are included, one will notice that they are almost always seated in accordance to their status, gender, and age, reinforcing a more rigid sense of social order. 
Analysis of Reception
Although I have provided only a cursory look into the ideological underpinnings of North Korean children's performances online, the real issue I am trying to gauge is the reception and effectiveness of these videos internationally in an inherently lopsided social media environment. Despite this dynamic, the comment forums do display an inherently "dialogic character" and, as Jones and Scheiffelin note, these forums are rich sites of metalinguistic data, even if they do also enable the "loudest" and "dumbest" voices of the Internet.
26 This is only compounded by the multi-lingual nature of the forums I looked at, where I came across comments in Russian, English, German, Korean, Italian, Spanish, French, Portuguese, Japanese, Mandarin, Vietnamese, and Thai. Reflecting upon this range of linguistic backgrounds, there was more diversity in the comments than I had anticipated going into this project. In this section, I provide a discourse analysis of these public comment feeds on YouTube and categorize the range of responses into various tendencies in order to make better sense of the data. In my analysis, I looked at approximately fifty videos and reviewed hundreds of responses to these videos. I tried to consider various languages and represent them here in a manner that reflects this diversity. 27 I have chosen to anonymize the user names excerpted below and it should be noted that the tags of "English" or "French" are only indications of the script of the user name and are not a reference to the ethnicity or nationality of the user. Before embarking on this project, I braced myself to encounter an endless parade of negative comments. To my surprise, I found that positive comments were fairly common. In this sampling below, a substantial contingent of positive commenters simply responded to the artistic or technical accomplishment of the young performers with little critical regard to the political context or implications of the videos.
1_English:
North ma quanto sono bravi questi due ragazzini !! e quanto hanno studiatos!!!!!! (but how good these two kids are !! and how much they have studied !!!!!!) 7_Spanish:
BELLISIMA, NIÑOS CON MUCHO TALENTO, ME ENCANTA EL SONIDO MUSICAL, BRAVISSIMA !!!!!!! (BEAUTIFUL, CHILDREN WITH A LOT OF TALENT, I LOVE THE MUSICAL SOUND, VERY GOOD !!!!!!!) 8_Russian:
Прекрасны! (Beautiful!) 9_Korean:
아이들이라기에는 놀라울정도로 실력이 좋네요. ^^ (The skill level is surprisingly good for kids. ^^) Based on the apolitical tone of most of these comments, one might even assume that these commenters were not even aware that these musicians were coming from North Korea. If they did, as with the first commenter (1_English), it seems that they were able to suspend any preconceived notions of the DPRK while surfing content on social media.
At the same time, there are others who are sympathetic with the North Korean state who have responded with somewhat ideologically informed praise of the DPRK, as can be seen in the comments below:
English_10:
Serving The bulk of this data was collected from YouTube in the summer of 2015, and to a limited extent, updated since then, mostly to see which videos and channels were still active. Since these comments were published on a public forum in the YouTube commenting field that accompanies each video, publishing samples of these public comments do not require obtaining informed consent. However, given the sensitive and political nature of some of the comments, I have anonymized the names of the users by numbering them and indicating the script of the language employed in the user name (not necessarily the language of the actual comment, which is sometimes in another language). It should be noted that the tags of "English" or "French" are only indications of the script of the user name and are not a reference to the ethnicity or nationality of the user.
North Korean nation! Let's protect our children from the satanic education from all over this sick planet.)
Demonstrating a deeper awareness of North Korean political ideology, the first commenter (English_10) Of the various discursive tendencies described above, this type of commentary goes the farthest in terms of distancing or othering the North Korean subject as somehow less than human, and perhaps it is no coincidence that many of these types of comments come from predominantly English speakers. Some extremely hostile commenters go even further and use the comments as a place to "troll" others, turning the forums into a profanity-laced ideological battleground.
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While some commenters display knowledge of North Korean or socialist ideology, a good majority of commenters make sense of what they are seeing through their own individual or ideological frames-more often than not missing or disregarding embedded ideological messages or lyrics specific to North Korea. For example, while many described the hyper-infantilization of children as "creepy," few understand its ideological context or history. In addition, for those who see these children as positive evidence of the benefits of a socialist system of education, few comment on the more uncomfortable and yet pervasive references to Kim Il Sung as a god-like father figure. As mentioned previously, these comment forums not only reveal what commenters think about North Koreans but also how they think about themselves in relation to North Koreans. Although the commenting forum does carry the potential of amplifying misunderstandings and knee-jerk opinions, it appears that-on the whole-the format of YouTube does enable a diversified engagement with North Korea, especially in comparison to that which is afforded on conventional media. In this way, North Korea's participation on social media may help cultivate outside support, especially with sympathetic socialist countries or communities-such as the North Korea-affiliated ethnic Koreans living in Japan.
29

Analysis of Remediated Videos
Another less common but potentially more effective means of making an impact on shaping opinion is through remediation. One could argue that most North Korean videos are already remediated (according to Bolter and Grusin's definition cited earlier), because the original medium is for television broadcast, clips of which are then excerpted and uploaded onto another medium such as YouTube. However, for the sake of this analysis, I look at further remediations that take place on YouTube. This can take many forms, from the reposting of videos with alternative tags, to the adding of subtitles, to the creation of simple cover videos or more elaborate parody mash-ups that remix audio and visual materials.
As alluded to previously, the mere act of a user named Viral Fill reposting a video in 2011 with a new label that reads "North Korean children playing guitars (Very Creepy)," garnered 57 million views. Although this particular highly popular link is no longer available, a similar one with the tag line "North Korean children playing the guitar Creepy as hell" is still available and has attracted approximately 84,100 views as of this writing (see YouTube link 1). The original video and its remediated variants became even more popular because the Seth Rogen-and Evan Goldberg-produced 2014 comedy film, The Interview, about a fictional meeting between two American journalists and Kim Jong-Un, includes a scene that essentially parodies this same performance of North Korean children playing guitar (see YouTube link 2). This demonstrates how even a very minimal form of remediation (re-labeling or re-framing a video) can have far-reaching impacts. In response to another popular North Korean children's video called "Ppo Ppo" or "Kiss," I found a few instances of users who re-posted the videos with inventive alternate Korean subtitles, in some cases drawing more than 2.5 million views. In one example (see link below), one user named SongYuBin (송유빈) disrupts the North Korean state-sanctioned intentions of this video in several intriguing ways.
29 Although I have not found significant evidence of North Koreans or North Korean refugees participating in these forums in large numbers, it will be interesting to see how the dynamics may shift if this changes.
First, the user relies on homonyms to construct alternate subtitles with subversive meanings. For example, in place of the culminating lyric of the first verse, "Ŭri appa ppo-ppo-ga chaeil chowa" (우리 아빠 뽀뽀가 제일 좋아) or "Our Daddy's kisses are the best," the user wrote "Ŭri appa ppop-ppo, ha chigyŏwŏ" (우리 아빠 뽑보, 하 지겨워), which could be interpreted as "Our Daddy's kisses, I'm sick of it" with a more exaggerated articulation on the word "kiss." This subverts a sweet sentiment of affection between a daughter and her father into one of annoyance and rejection. Furthermore, instead the first line of the verse, "Naega kowa ppo-ppo" (내가 고와 뽀뽀) or "I am beautiful, kisses," the user writes "Naegachok ppop-po" (내가족 뽑뽀), which means "My family's kisses." This immediately brings the whole family into her hyper-emotional orbit (see figure 6 and YouTube link 3). In a darker interpretation, this same alternate subtitle could also mean "My family was selected," which could gesture in an oblique way towards the inequality of being selected for better access to resources or treatment, or alternatively, for punishment. The second verse continues along similar lines, substituting the Mommy for the Daddy figure. Here, the user varies the homonym technique and pokes fun of North Korean "otherness" by using alternate spellings to reference a North Korean or Hwanghaedo provincial dialect, as in the spelling of "mommy" (엄마) or "ŏmma" as "omma" (옴마) with a long "o" vowel (See figure 7) . More intriguingly, the subtitles continue to mark difference in ever more creative ways by inserting increasingly varied disruptions into the subtitle stream, such as sonic syllables, exaggerated punctuation, Korean texting language and slang, emoticons, symbols, imagined internal commentary, and random behavioral description (see figures 7 and 8). The sonic syllables or vocables introduce sound and noise into the experience by initially reducing the musical accordion accompaniment into a series of "k'ong jjak" (콩짝) syllables (see figure 8) . Korean vocables and texting language are further used to reference exaggerated vocal articulations, laughter, and, of course, the lip-smacking sound of kisses. These techniques, along with the imagined internal commentary and behavioral description, emphasize North Korean difference by critiquing the over-the-top expressiveness and quality of hysteria of the performance as a whole. Moreover, the purposely out-of-context use of South Korean texting language conventions, such as linguistic endings that emphasize "cuteness" or aegyo and emoticons, call metalinguistic attention to the stark idiomatic differences between North and South Korean modes of expression. Although not all of these interventions can be read as clearly subversive, the cumulative effect of these metalinguistic disruptions is that the subject appears to become more and more unstable as the song goes along. Another interesting phenomenon that has spun out of this "Kiss" video is the creation of lip-sync videos. In one example, a White, presumably North American female teenager wears a red and white gingham dress with her long hair in two messy buns, reminiscent of the popular culture character Princess Leia.
Original Lyrics New Subtitles
31 Her eyes are deliberately overexposed as she mimics the "Kiss" video in a flippant parody. In another, a plainly dressed South Asian female and self-described "Big fan : )" performs a remarkably earnest lip-sync. I am particularly struck by her close attention to the nuances of facial expression and hand gestures here that are somewhat resonant with the stylistic conventions of Indian music and dance. If there is parody here, it exists only with a slight wink as if to say, "I know this is trite but I like it anyway" (see figure 9 ). 32 This tone is also present in another video response by a White male, who similarly bills himself as Kim Sol Mae's "number one fan." However, with his addition of a shiny black and red kimono and over-the-top gestures, his interpretation veers more into campy exuberance (see YouTube Link 4). In another form of remediation, a France-based group and YouTube user called Magoyond created a remixed video that edits both the viral guitar-playing children and "Kiss" visuals together with the audio of the djent metal band Meshuggah's best-known song "Bleed" (see YouTube Link 5). On the surface, this intervention is reminiscent of "jamming," which according to Mark Déry is CB (citizens band) radio slang for the "illegal practice of interrupting radio broadcasts or conversations between fellow hams with lip farts, obscenities, and other equally jejune hijinx." 33 Here, though, the joke is on North Korea. Judging from the YouTube comments, many found this remix to be hilarious and, in the words of one commenter, it was "...the funniest thing I've seen on YT." However, there is a subversive political undertone here, and I argue that this remix could also be interpreted in terms of what Mark Déry further develops as "culture jamming," which he describes as the intentional disruption of the media's power to control through the "manipulation of symbols," often by using the same tools to expose or disrupt this manipulation.
34 Here, Magoyond interrupts, remixes and ultimately upends the ideological intentions of these videos, so that these cute, well-disciplined children suddenly become exposed as "demonic" subjects-or perhaps victims-of a warped society. With the replacement of the original audio with Meshuggah's unrelenting song, "Bleed," which is a biting commentary on humankind's contradictory and yet symbiotic relationship to violence, the clip gains an aura of oppressive heaviness that runs antithetical to the child-oriented subject matter of the original songs. Although some commenters seem to concur with this darker, lyric-based interpretation, admitting that they do not know whether to laugh or cry for these kids, the truth is that its reception has been varied. While many found this remediation to be cool and clever in its unlikely juxtaposition of content, some Meshuggah fans felt that the "footage is much more brutal than the music itself." According to Déry, this is as it should be, as culture jammers are "part artistic terrorists, part vernacular critics" who "introduce noise into the signal as it passes from transmitter to receiver, encouraging idiosyncratic, unintended interpretations." 
Conclusion
North Korea's engagement with social media has enabled unprecedented levels of international engagement with its state-sponsored media, and I argue that children's performances are a flashpoint for this activity. This is evident in the disproportionately high number of views that they attract in relation to other types of content. To summarize my analysis, I have found that the range of responses is much more diverse, and in some cases, more reflective and self-reflexive than I had anticipated. I was also surprised by the high level of engagement, as evidenced in the large number of views and comments as well as by the intensity of these responses, positive or negative. Interestingly, the more nuanced and critical responses tapped into individual anxieties about the future-as projected onto the Othered North Korean child subject-anxieties about how to best raise and educate children in a politically divisive and competitive world.
As David Novak points out in his landmark article on remediation, "contemporary subjects live much of their lives through media. They reappropriate received materials for widely divergent personal goals, and construct social relations through an intertextual discourse of mediated references."
36 This certainly is true of the users who remediated North Korean children's performance content that I examined for this article. I would add that the logic of hypermediacy as defined by Bolter and Grusin "as a style of visual representation whose goal is to remind the viewer of the medium" was ever present in the examples I highlighted. 37 Remediators of North Korean children's performances were able to "remind the viewer of the medium" by calling attention to stark differences in mediums and styles (texting styles, languages, styles and genres of music, performance gestures, and costumes): the more unlikely and clever the juxtaposition, the better the result. In this light, North Korean content works well for remediators in developed, global societies such as the US, given the DPRK's relatively high level of isolation and difference from the rest of the world. David Novak concludes his article on remediation by drawing on the work of anthropologist Anna Tsing, saying that remediations are not co-productions but are often unequal collaborations that are indicative of "overlapping but discrepant forms of cosmopolitanism" that contribute to a broader global "friction."
38 In the case of North Korea, where access to the Internet is drastically limited, the unequal power dynamic is especially pronounced. Moreover, without many real points of contact or sparks of dialogue, I wonder whether North Korea's social media experiment does enough to create the kind of powerful "global connections" that come to life in "friction" in the way that Anna Tsing describes. 39 Tsing writes that "friction is a reminder of the importance in defining movement, cultural form, and agency" and that "friction is required to keep global power in motion." 40 She observes that while "friction makes global connection powerful and effective," it can also "get in the way of the smooth operation of global power" and could eventually spur refusal and insurrection. 41 I argue that North Korea is a unique case and is less susceptible to the workings of global power. The DPRK is no doubt well-aware of the "friction" that could be unleashed if more North Koreans were able to travel and/or access the Internet. This may explain North Korea's vacillating relationship with social media, where as recently as spring of 2018, reporters have noticed a marked drop-off in use, after a period of noteworthy increase among North Korean elites.
42
While many outside of North Korea are free to remediate and comment upon videos, the North Korean children featured in these videos cannot further elaborate upon or interpolate their stories in the social media environment. In fact, their silence outside the frame of these videos is disconcerting for many commenters as they speculate about the fates of these children. I am also struck by how difficult it is for many viewers to see these children as just children and not as politicized, ideological subjects. Although it is outside the scope of this project, it is possible that combined with other forms of media engagement on the ground through the "sneakernet" or the exchange of media smuggled on USB drives in North Korea or among North Korean refugee communities, that a broader global friction is beginning to take hold to make a larger impact on North Koreans and non-North Koreans alike.
